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INTRODUCTION 
Dewey & LeBoeuf, once one of the largest firms in the world, 
employed more than 1,300 lawyers in twelve countries.1 A prime 
example of the prototypical American law firm, Dewey & LeBoeuf 
attracted some of the best lawyers in the country with its prestige and 
promises of multi-million dollar bonuses.2 However, in what is called 
“the largest law firm failure in U.S. history,” Dewey & LeBoeuf filed 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 28, 2012.3 As one former federal judge 
put it, “‘[t]his is a very sad day for the legal profession, . . . Dewey is 
a fabled firm with a lot of great lawyers and a demise of this magnitude 
is unprecedented.’”4 
Just two months earlier, amidst speculation and inconsistencies in 
news reports, the American Lawyer announced that it would revise its 
2010 and 2011 financial reports for Dewey & LeBoeuf’s revenue and 
profitability.5 By then, many of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s partners already 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Linda Sandler & Sophia Pearson, After Dewey & LeBoeuf, It’s Lawyers v. Lawyers, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, May 31, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/after-dewey-and-
leboeuf-its-lawyers-v-dot-lawyers. For a general discussion of law firm failures and speculated causes, 
see Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy (commenting that many 
observers of the Dewey & LeBoeuf bankruptcy, and of other large firm failures, attribute the collapse to 
the trend of firms “discard[ing] the traditional notions of partnership—loyalty, collegiality, a sense of 
equality—and instead transform[ing] themselves into bottom-line, profit-maximizing businesses”). 
 2. Lattman, supra note 1 (attributing the Dewey failure to rapid growth, aggressive hiring, excessive 
salaries, and a large gap between salaries of senior and junior partners). 
 3. Brian Baxter, Demise of Dewey Eclipses Deaths of Smaller Firms, AM. L. DAILY, Sept. 13, 2012, 
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202571092557&Demise_of_Dewey_eclipse
s_deaths_of_smaller_firms&slreturn=20120813092324; Lattman, supra note 1. 
 4. Lattman, supra note 1. Dewey & LeBoeuf was not the only mega-firm to file bankruptcy in recent 
years. See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, Howrey: When the Sinking Ship Seeks the Cheese Back From the Fleeing 
Rats, FORBES, Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2012/08/01/howrey-when-the-
sinking-ship-seeks-the-cheese-back-from-the-fleeing-rats (discussing the bankruptcy of Howrey, a firm 
with more than 500 attorneys in sixteen offices); Leigh Jones, Federal Judge Leaves Heller Litigation in 
Bankruptcy Court, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Dec. 14, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomson 
reuters.com/Bankruptcy/News/2011/12_-_December/Federal_judge_leaves_Heller_litigation_in_ 
bankruptcy_court (discussing the bankruptcy of Heller Ehrman, a firm of more than 500 attorneys); Nate 
Raymond, Thelen Loses Clawback Case Against Seyfarth, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Sept. 4, 
2012, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/California/News/2012/09_-_September/Thelen_loses_ 
clawback_case_against_Seyfarth (discussing the bankruptcy of Thelen, a firm of more than 400 
attorneys). 
 5. Peter Lattman, Prosecutors Scrutinize Ex-Head of Dewey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/new-york-prosecutors-examining-former-dewey-chairman. 
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left the firm, and the firm announced cuts to attorneys’ rank and 
administrative staff, reorganized its management structure, and 
relocated from New York to London.6 Almost immediately after the 
American Lawyer made its announcement, another twenty-three 
partners left, bringing the total number of departures to sixty-seven 
since the beginning of the year.7 In late April, Dewey & LeBoeuf 
informed its partners that the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office was 
investigating the firm for financial misconduct of its chairman, Steven 
Davis.8 Over the next five days, Dewey & LeBoeuf desperately tried 
to keep the firm afloat by entering merger discussions with two law 
firms to no avail.9 With more than one third of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s 
partners gone, the firm announced that it would close its doors and file 
for bankruptcy.10 On March 6, 2014, Steven Davis and others were 
indicted on more than 100 counts, including grand larceny, falsifying 
business records, and securities fraud.11 
Unfortunately, as is the case with many businesses, Dewey & 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Key Events for Dewey, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230407 
0304577394163080970888.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (providing a timeline of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s 
2012 failure). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; Lattman, supra note 5. 
 9. Key Events for Dewey, supra note 6. In addition to the merger discussions, Dewey & LeBoeuf 
planned to put the executive floor of its headquarters up for lease, hoping to bring in millions each year. 
Id. 
 10. Id. In the weeks leading up to this announcement, two associates reported their health coverage 
lapsed for lack of payment, though the firm denied lack of payment and said there was a simple routing 
issue that would soon be corrected. Id. Additionally, partners were told they would not receive paychecks 
unless they submitted all outstanding client bills and time sheets. Id. 
 11. Concluding their two-year investigation, New York City officials further complicated troubles for 
the Dewey & LeBoeuf estate, charging Davis and his top lieutenants with over 106 counts for alleged 
criminal activity dating back to 2008. Jennifer Smith & Ashby Jones, Fallen Law Firm’s Leaders Are 
Charged With Fraud, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304554004 
579423082266343204?mg=r eno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001 
424052702304554004579423082266343204.html (lasted visited Mar. 6, 2014). The defunct firm’s 
litigation woes also extend to civil suits filed by ex-partners and include allegations of third-party 
assistance in concealing the fraud. Jennifer Smith, Dewey’s Former Leaders Sued, WALL ST. J., June 13, 
2012, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023034104045774649624924 
31118.html (discussing a lawsuit filed by a former partner against the firm alleging it ran a Ponzi scheme 
with money invested by partners); Casey Sullivan, Ex-Dewey Partner: Citibank Schemed with Firm to 
Hide its Woes, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Aug. 31, 2012, http://newsandinsight.thomson 
reuters.com/Legal/News/2012/08_-_August/Ex-Dewey_partner__Citibank_schemed_with_firm_to 
_hide_its_woes (discussing counterclaim for fraudulent inducement filed against Citibank by former 
Dewey partner sued for defaulting on a loan). 
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LeBoeuf was unable to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, and by 
the time it filed bankruptcy, Dewey & LeBoeuf owed more than $300 
million to banks and other creditors and had more than $200 million 
in outstanding client billings, with at least $60 million in unfinished 
work taken to new firms.12 When Dewey & LeBoeuf and its creditors 
reached a settlement deal to avoid potential clawback claims, it seemed 
as though the troubles were behind the deflated firm and its partners, 
pending court approval.13 The deal involved a $71 million payout from 
more than 400 partners’ profits to the estate in exchange for immunity 
from future lawsuits.14 However, the partners, and even their future 
employers, will still be liable for any “unfinished business” of the firm, 
irrespective of any settlement deal.15 
When a law firm files bankruptcy or voluntarily dissolves, the 
partners are subject to the unfinished business rule.16 This rule makes 
it possible for a partner’s future fees derived from the dissolved firm’s 
“unfinished business” to be taken back as property of the estate—even 
if the partner completes the business while employed at a new firm.17 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Lattman, supra note 5 (noting that Dewey & LeBoeuf was unable to cope with financial 
difficulties stemming from mismanagement with the economic recession in the backdrop); Key Events for 
Dewey, supra note 6; Martha Neil, Dewey & LeBoeuf Estate Seeks $103.6M Clawback from Bankrupt 
Firm’s Former Partners, A.B.A. J., July 11, 2012, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/dewey_ 
leboeuf_estate_seeks_103.6m_clawback_from_bankrupt_firms_former_partn (summarizing Dewey & 
LeBoeuf’s debts). 
 13. See Casey Sullivan, Judge Approves $71.5 mln Dewey Settlement, NAT’L LEGAL NEWS FROM 
REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2012. 
  The trustee in a bankruptcy has a number of tools at his disposal to bring property back into the 
estate. Certain clawback provisions in the Bankruptcy Code allow a trustee to reclaim property acquired 
post-petition and treat that property as though it was acquired pre-petition, so it may be included in the 
amount available to creditors. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D 
DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS § C55 (2013) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012)). The purpose of 
these clawback or avoidance actions is to prevent the debtor from manipulating the bankruptcy filing date 
to avoid paying certain creditors. Id. In addition to post-petition options, the trustee has a number of 
avoidance powers to reclaim pre-petition transfers. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. 
 14. Sullivan, supra note 13. Dewey originally hoped to raise $90.4 million from the $432 million it 
paid to 670 partners in 2011 and 2012 in its settlement. Alanna Byrne, Dewey Asks Court to Approve $70 
Million Clawback Settlement, INSIDE COUNCIL FROM WSJ AND REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2012, available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/08/30/dewey-asks-court-to-approve-70-million-clawback-se. The 
settlement would involve the trustee and the former partners, whereby the trustee would not pursue its 
clawback and avoidance powers in exchange for an agreed upon amount. Id. 
 15. See Sullivan, supra note 13 (discussing the Dewey & LeBoeuf settlement deal and noting that the 
trustee may still pursue unfinished business claims). 
 16. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 17. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477 
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As one court described it, unfinished business is “any business covered 
by retainer agreements between the firm and its clients for the 
performance of partnership services that existed at the time of 
dissolution.”18 Stated another way, when a partnership dissolves, the 
client matters do not automatically dissolve with it.19 Attorneys go 
their separate ways, each taking a piece of the partnership with them 
in the form of clients, and to the extent that a partner works on a client 
matter that was “unfinished” at the time of dissolution, that partner 
must account to his fellow partners, or the estate, for that amount.20 
Despite its decades-long history, two parts of the law are entirely 
unsettled with courts, some even within the same district reaching 
opposite conclusions.21 The first unanswered question asks what types 
of client billing qualify as “unfinished” for purposes of applying the 
rule, and more specifically, whether hourly fees should be included in 
that calculation.22 Some courts argue that including hourly fees will 
improperly impede the attorney-client relationship by treating the 
client as nothing more than property of the estate.23 Other courts argue 
that hourly fees should be included because one could not distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
B.R. 318, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Partnership property remains partnership property, dissolution 
notwithstanding, and a former partner of the dissolved firm must account for any benefit he derives from 
his use of a partnership asset, even if he is not among the ‘winding up partners’ charged with winding up 
the firm’s affairs.”). 
 18. In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R. 318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983)) (“[W]hat constitutes 
unfinished business must be determined on the date of dissolution of the partnership, not based on events 
occurring thereafter.” (citing Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 1993))). 
 19. See Amanda A. Main, Applying the Unfinished Business Rule to Dissolved Law Partnerships, L.A. 
LAW., Mar. 2010, at 10 (discussing the origin of the unfinished business rule and its application in both 
voluntary dissolutions and bankruptcies). 
 20. See id. Obligations under the unfinished business rule can be waived, however, with express 
partnership agreements. Id. For a discussion of these so-called “Jewel waivers,” see infra note 47. 
 21. Compare Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 742–43 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), with In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 330–31. 
 22. See Joan C. Rogers, New York, California Law Differ on Who Gets Defunct Firm’s Fees in Pending 
Hourly Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA, Sept. 12, 2012, http://www.bna.com/new-york-california-n1717986 
9614 (summarizing a recent case in the Southern District of New York rejecting the inclusion of hourly 
fees in unfinished business claims). 
 23. An integral principle in the practice of law is that the client has an absolute right to hire or discharge 
an attorney. See Echlin v. Sup. Ct. of San Mateo Cnty., 90 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1939). To consider the hourly-
billed client’s business as firm property, the client’s autonomy will be reduced to nothing more than an 
interest in property. See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
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hourly from contingency fees, which are included.24 The second 
question asks what level of compensation attorneys should be entitled 
to receive for their services.25 
Part I of this Note explains the foundation for the unfinished 
business rule through the Uniform Partnership Act, fiduciary duties, 
and Jewel v. Boxer, the seminal case interpreting the unfinished 
business rule in law firm dissolutions.26 Part II addresses the recent 
split among courts regarding whether hourly cases should be included 
as part of the rule.27 Part III proposes hourly fees be excluded from the 
unfinished business rule given the inclusion’s detrimental effect on 
public policy.28 
I.   AN ATTORNEY’S BAGGAGE: THE INCOMPLETE HISTORY OF THE 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE 
Lawyers seem to universally view the unfinished business rule as 
both impactful and burdensome.29 Some have called the rule an 
“imperfect rule [that] law firms have to live with,” while others have 
gone much further, comparing its application in modern practice to 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Compare In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 743 (distinguishing hourly from contingency fees), with In re 
Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331 (finding no meaningful distinction between types of fees). 
Contingency fee rates are based on a set percentage of the damage award in the case. Lawyers and Legal 
Fees, ST. B. GA., http://www.gabar.org/newsandpublications/consumerpamphlets/fees.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). This type of arrangement is most common in personal injury cases. Id. Hourly fee rates are 
set based on the amount of time expended by a particular attorney. Id. 
 25. Valerie P. Morrison & Dylan G. Trache, Jewel v. Boxer: The Unfinished Business of Bankrupt 
Law Firms, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, Apr. 2012, at 92 (“The case law provides little guidance to assist 
parties in determining the amount of profit recoverable in Jewel actions.”). 
 26. See discussion infra Part I. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II. 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. This Proposal assumes the parties have not entered into a partnership 
agreement to the contrary. This Note proposes changes to the default standards and does not advocate for 
a rule limiting partners’ ability to contract for specific aspects of the unfinished business rule. 
 29. See Paul R. Hage & Patrick R. Mohan, You Can’t Take Them with You: Coudert Brothers and the 
Application of the Unfinished-Business Rule to Dissolved Law Firms, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2012, 
at 14, 73 (discussing In re Coudert Bros., where the court allowed the unfinished business rule to apply 
to both former partners and their new law firms); Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92–93 (noting 
that law firms need to keep in mind the possibility of litigation to reclaim profits from unfinished 
business); Joan C. Rogers, Law Firms Must Pay Back Profits Earned on Dissolved Law Firm’s Hourly-
Fee Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA, June 6, 2012, http://www.bna.com/law-firms-pay-n12884909901 
(discussing arguments against the unfinished business rule in law firms). 
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“‘watching an accident in slow motion.’”30 Not only can departing 
partners face litigation from creditors and the trustee seeking to claw 
back any profits from the bankrupt firm’s unfinished business, a 
partner’s future employer can face the same liability if it receives 
profits through the unfinished business of the bankrupt firm.31 For that 
reason, it is important, if not vital, for law firms to beware of the rule 
and put clear partnership agreements in place.32 
A.   The Birth of the Unfinished Business Rule: Partnership Acts and 
Fiduciary Duties 
The unfinished business rule developed through a long, and often 
unmentioned road, with its origin in fiduciary duties owed through 
partnership law.33 Partners owe fiduciary duties not only to each other, 
but also to the partnership as a whole.34 The rationale for these duties 
encourages, if not requires, implementation of rules that “circumscribe 
the exercise of the partners’ managerial discretion.”35 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Rogers, supra note 29. 
 31. See Hage & Mohan, supra note 29, at 72–73; Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92–93. 
 32. Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 91 (encouraging law firms to amend partnership agreements 
to clarify all rights and obligations pursuant to the firm’s unfinished business in the event of dissolution 
and in order to avoid future litigation to recover the unfinished business of the firm). 
 33. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL 
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 16:20 (2011) (“The right to wind up partnership affairs carries with it a 
duty to do so, and a partner who is engaged in winding up the partnership continues to have fiduciary 
duties to the partnership and his or her copartners.” (footnotes omitted)). A fiduciary duty is defined as 
“[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary . . . ; 
a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests 
of the other person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009). 
 34. LESLIE D. CORWIN, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS § 1.03 (2013); see also D.C. CODE 
§ 29-604.04 (West, WestlawNext through Oct. 16, 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-3-404 (West, 
WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess. of 62d Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-404 
(West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assem.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449.21 (West, 
WestlawNext through P.A.2013, No. 277 of 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67-
424 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1A-404 (West, WestlawNext 
through First Reg. Sess. of 51st Leg.); N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 43 (West, WestlawNext through L.2013, ch. 
157); O.C.G.A. § 14-8-21 (2003 & 2013 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-404 (West, WestlawNext 
through 2013 First. Reg. Sess.); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 25.05.165 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 
legislation); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21 (1914). 
 35. Michael Haynes, Comment, Partners Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest Loyalty . . . . or 
Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which Partners May Limit Their Duty of Loyalty to One Another, 
37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 433, 437 (2005) (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG 
AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a)(1) (2004)) (internal quotations omitted). In the absence of 
fiduciary duties among partners, one partner could utilize and exploit the assets of the partnership with no 
7
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In the majority of states, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), or its 
successor, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA),36 governs 
partnerships.37 The UPA does not explicitly provide any duty of care 
in the partnership context; in fact, it says almost nothing about what 
specific duties partners owe to one another.38 According to the 
Uniform Law Commission, 
[t]he 1914 Act has very little to say about a partner’s 
responsibilities to the other partners. A partner is a fiduciary who 
“must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as a 
trustee for it any profit derived by him without the consent of the 
other partners . . . ” There is a full duty of disclosure between 
partners, but the 1914 Act is otherwise silent on the fiduciary 
responsibilities of each partner to the other partners.39 
In stark contrast, the RUPA explicitly provides for both a duty of 
care and a duty of loyalty to fellow partners and the partnership.40 
                                                                                                                 
accountability. Id. 
 36. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101 (1997). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act has been enacted 
in thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Legislative Fact Sheet—
Partnership Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership 
Act (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming”). 
 37. Russell C. Smith, Comment, How the Uniform Partnership Act Determines Ultimate Liability for 
a Claim Against a General Partnership and Provides for the Settling of Accounts Between Partners, 17 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 359 (1995) (listing all states that have passed a version of the Uniform Partnership 
Act and noting that Louisiana is the only state that has not passed the UPA). However, the UPA can vary 
widely from state to state. Compare id. (noting that some states have made minor changes such as using 
gender neutral terms and distinguishing limited liability partnerships), with CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra 
note 33, § 1:1 n.4 (emphasizing that Georgia’s version of the law, enacted in 1984, is vastly different from 
the model UPA). 
 38. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 3; see also CORWIN, supra note 34, at § 1.03. 
 39. Partnership Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title= 
Partnership Act (quoting the Uniform Partnership Act (1914)) (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). The Uniform 
Law Commission is a “non-profit unincorporated association, comprised of state commissions on uniform 
laws from each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.” About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About the ULC 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 40. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (“The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership 
and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).”). 
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Further, RUPA does not allow parties to waive these duties of loyalty 
and care, even with partnership agreements to the contrary.41 The duty 
of care, in the context of law firm dissolutions, refers to a duty owed 
“to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding 
up of the partnership business” and requires partners to refrain “from 
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”42 
More relevant within the context of the unfinished business rule is 
the duty of loyalty, which is the primary justification for the rule.43 
This duty is generally defined as “[a] person’s duty not to engage in 
self-dealing or otherwise use his or her position to further personal 
interests rather than those of the beneficiary.”44 As one court noted, 
there is, and should be, a “reasonable balance” between a partner’s 
right to pursue “his own business after dissolution . . . and his duty of 
loyalty to his ex-copartners.”45 
 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. § 404 cmt. 1. 
 42. Id. § 404(c). 
 43. As part of the duty of loyalty, each partner owes to his fellow partners a duty to “wind[] up” the 
unfinished business of the firm. Id. § 802 (emphasis added). Only when partners complete all unfinished 
matters can this duty expire. Id; see also CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, § 16:20; Christopher C. 
Wang, Comment, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Allocating Fees From the Unfinished Business of a 
Professional Corporation, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (1997). 
The duty of loyalty is defined as follows: 
A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the 
following: 
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit 
derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived 
from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a 
partnership opportunity; 
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the 
partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; 
and 
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership 
business before the dissolution of the partnership. 
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (emphasis added). 
 44. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009). 
 45. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 192 (Ct. App. 1983) (“The partner may 
take for his own account new business even when emanating from clients of the dissolved partnership and 
the partner is entitled to the reasonable value of the services in completing the partnership business, but 
he may not seize for his own account the business which was in existence during the term of the 
partnership.”). 
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B.   When One Door Closes Another Door Opens . . . But It Will Cost 
You: Jewel v. Boxer 
Jewel v. Boxer is the preeminent case interpreting the unfinished 
business rule in a law firm context.46 In Jewel, four partners voluntarily 
dissolved their partnership but with no written partnership agreement 
in place, leaving the UPA to govern the dissolution.47 When two 
partners brought suit for an accounting, the court recognized the UPA 
imposes a duty to “wind up” all unfinished business before a 
partnership may dissolve.48 For that reason, partners must share all 
profits and costs incurred resulting from the firm’s unfinished 
business.49 The court noted the dual purpose of the unfinished business 
rule: (1) to stop partners from competing with one another over the 
most profitable cases and (2) to prevent partners from fighting over 
partnership property.50 Relying on UPA language, the court held that 
partners are not entitled to extra compensation for completing the 
unfinished business of the firm.51 Until all unfinished business of the 
firm was complete, each partner must account to his fellow partners 
for any profits.52 Additionally, the court ruled that all profits must be 
allocated based on each partner’s interest in the partnership, rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct. App. 1984). Jewel did not involve the bankruptcy of a 
law firm but rather the voluntary dissolution of a partnership; in relatively few cases have the courts 
interpreted Jewel in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 
WL 4542512 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011); In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1998). 
 47. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Despite the fact that a partnership cannot waive the fiduciary duty 
among partners, the Jewel court stated, “absent a contrary agreement, any income generated through the 
winding up of unfinished business is allocated to the former partners according to their respective interests 
in the partnership.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this to mean that partners can put 
a “Jewel waiver” in their agreements; however, these waivers must be put in place well before bankruptcy 
to avoid a fraudulent transfer claim. See In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R. 318, 348 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling that although the Jewel waiver was legally valid it was technically a 
transfer of assets while insolvent, and accordingly, could be challenged as a fraudulent transfer); Hage & 
Mohan, supra note 29, at 15. For a discussion of In re Brobeck and the fraudulent transfer implications, 
see Main, supra note 19. 
 48. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19. 
 49. Id. (recognizing that the burden of unfinished business cannot “fall on one former partner or one 
group of former partners, unless the former partners agree otherwise”). 
 50. Id. at 18. 
 51. Id. at 17 (ruling that the UPA “unequivocally prohibits” any additional compensation for 
completion of unfinished business of the firm). 
 52. Id. 
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on a quantum meruit basis.53 
Despite a compelling argument to the contrary, the court went on to 
rule that the client’s right to choose counsel remained untouched 
because the unfinished business rule applied only to fees allocated 
after the client made the choice.54 The partners’ argument was simple: 
“[F]ees . . . earned by the partner chosen by the client are not subject 
to division in accordance with the partnership agreement” because that 
would nullify the client’s chosen counsel if it were forced to pay 
attorneys he did not choose.55 
Jewel did not specifically address the rule within a bankruptcy 
context or determine what types of future payments applied to the 
unfinished business rule.56 Thus, the question remained: what else 
could be included as property of the estate?57 The Bankruptcy Code 
defines property of the estate as “all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”58 Although 
contingency fees unquestionably are included in this definition, it is 
uncertain whether hourly fees should be included as well.59 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 16–17 (reasoning that, as property of the partnership and not of the individual partners, profits 
from the unfinished business of the firm could not be divided based on the amount of work done by each 
partner, but rather must adhere to each partner’s respective partnership interests). The court relied heavily 
on precedent in reaching its decision, summarizing Resnick v. Kaplan, where the court held that “‘in the 
absence of any provision in the partnership document, . . . the aggregate of the fees collected should be 
allocated according to the percentages specified in the [partnership] agreement for the distribution of 
profits and losses.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)). 
 54. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17. Two of the Jewel partners argued that “forcing them to share future 
profits infringed upon their clients’ absolute right to select the attorney of their choice.” Main, supra note 
19, at 12. The court, however, was unreceptive. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17–18 (citing Rosenfeld, Meyer 
& Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983) and Resnick, 434 A.3d at 588) (“[T]he right of a 
client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as between partners with respect to income 
from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one another. Once the client’s fee is paid to an 
attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is allocated among the attorney and his or her former 
partners.”). 
 55. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (quoting Resnick, 434 A.3d at 588) (internal quotations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 15. 
 57. See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(addressing whether hourly fees are included in the unfinished business rule). 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
 59. See Arthur J. Ciampi, Claims for Unfinished Business Should be Avoided, N.Y. L.J., July 27, 2012, 
available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202564502246&thepage=1 
(noting that the unfinished business rule has frequently applied to contingent fee cases). 
  Although early cases seemed to signal that hourly fees would apply, there has been a recent 
movement rejecting this approach. See, e.g., In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 743 (excluding hourly fees from 
property of the estate); Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, 950 N.Y.S.2d 611, at *6 
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In addition to whether hourly fees constitute property of the estate, 
courts struggle with how to calculate “profits” for the purposes of the 
unfinished business rule.60 A primary distinction between the original 
and revised versions of the UPA is the level of compensation afforded 
to attorneys after the profits are deemed property of the estate.61 Under 
the UPA, attorneys must adhere to the no compensation rule, which 
leaves them without any additional compensation for their services 
while completing the unfinished business of the firm.62 Despite this 
rule, and likely due to the inherent unfairness it brings, many courts 
applying the original version of the UPA have allowed for out-of-
pocket expenses, the partner’s profit share, and any overhead costs 
associated with completing the business.63 Like the UPA’s 
modifications, the RUPA entitles partners to reasonable compensation 
in winding up the firm’s unfinished business, though it remains unclear 
what constitutes reasonable compensation.64 In applying the modified 
UPA or RUPA, judges are reluctant to take on the “thorny task” of 
calculating profits, highlighting the desperate need for a more uniform 
system to avoid infinite litigation issues.65 
 
                                                                                                                 
(Sup. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing a distinction between contingent fees, which 
are traditionally included in the unfinished business rule, and hourly fees, which it ruled should not be 
included). But see, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert 
Bros. LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 344 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (hourly fees constitute property of the estate); 
In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 405 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[H]ourly-fee cases pending at 
the time of dissolution constitute the Debtor’s ‘unfinished businesses.’”). 
 60. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 349–50. 
 61. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 744 (emphasizing that the RUPA has, in favor of a reasonable 
compensation standard, abolished the UPA standard of no compensation that was heavily relied upon in 
Jewel). 
 62. Main, supra note 19, at 11. 
 63. Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92. 
 64. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(g) (1997); see also Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92. As 
one court noted, precedent has allowed for attorneys to deduct “an amount attributable to the ‘efforts, 
skill, and diligence’ expended” while completing the unfinished business. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin 
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11 civ. 5994(CM), 2012 WL 2952929, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). That same judge, however, granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue 
of how best to calculate profits using such an ambiguous standard, noting the extensive investigation 
necessary to complete the analysis. Id. 
 65. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 349–50 (“Resolving those issues raises new questions that go 
far beyond the bounds of this opinion . . . [.]”). 
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II.   HOURLY FEES AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE: AN 
ATTEMPT AT FAIRNESS OR A NEVER ENDING DUTY? 
Although it once seemed that the unfinished business rule would 
apply universally, a split developed with some courts taking a new 
position—hourly fees have no place in the unfinished business rule.66 
Those courts favoring the majority rule, which includes hourly fees as 
unfinished business, do so because, to them, there is no meaningful 
way to distinguish between the two types of fees.67 These courts 
believe Jewel’s failure to explicitly distinguish between hourly and 
contingency fee cases suggests the court’s intention for the rule to 
apply universally.68 Two recent decisions have suggested otherwise.69 
In these cases, courts found ways to differentiate between the hourly 
and contingency fees, emphasizing the severe implications of 
inclusion, suggesting the need to limit the rule to contingency fees 
alone.70 Recognizing the strong arguments on both sides, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently certified the question to the New 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Compare id. at 344 (including hourly fees in the unfinished business rule), and In re Labrum & 
Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (same), and Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
571, 573 (Ct. App. 1993) (same), with In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741 (ruling that hourly fees are not 
included in the unfinished business rule), and Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, 
No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011) (same). 
 67. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 337 (ruling that the distinction in manner of compensation 
should make no difference to the unfinished business rule) (“‘The nature of the underlying contractual 
relationship between the dissolved partnership and its client does not alter the legal status of a dissolved 
partnership nor does it change the fiduciary duties each partner must honor towards another. They remain 
the same regardless of how an attorney agrees to be compensated by his clients.’” (quoting Robinson v. 
Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1997))); In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 396 (ruling that hourly 
fees are property of a bankruptcy estate); Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (ruling that the unfinished 
business rule includes “all matters in progress” that are incomplete upon dissolution). 
 68. See, e.g., Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (relying on Jewel’s lack of clarification as to the manner 
of payment involved and deciding that the lack of explicit distinction cannot be construed to imply the 
court’s intention that hourly fees should be excluded). In Jewel, there was no recognition of the specific 
type of fee arrangement involved; instead, the court stated only that Boxer and two others “handled most 
of the active personal injury and workers’ compensation cases.” Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct. 
App. 1984). The rest, as well as other kinds of cases, were handled by other attorneys in the firm. Id. 
 69. See generally In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 745; Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6. 
 70. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 735 (emphasizing that conceptualizing property of the estate to include 
hourly fees “collides with the essence of the attorney-client relationship”); Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, 
at *6 (reasoning that fees derived from contingency work could result in an amount larger than the amount 
of work expended by the attorney, but when hourly fees are considered, the former partner would likely 
be undercompensated for his efforts). 
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York Court of Appeals for its review.71 
A.   “Quaint” Principles in Modern Practice: Including Hourly Fees 
in the Unfinished Business Rule 
1.   Labrum & Doak, LLP 
Fourteen years after Jewel, a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania ruled that the unfinished business rule was intended 
to cover both contingency and hourly fees while simultaneously 
recognizing the result “may appear unfair.”72 Labrum & Doak voted 
to dissolve in July 1997, and six months later, the firm entered an 
involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy.73 The unsecured creditors 
committee brought an adversary proceeding against former partners to 
recover unfinished business billed on an hourly basis.74 In deciding 
that hourly fees constitute property of the estate, the court relied on a 
mix of bankruptcy law,75 partnership law,76 and public policy 
considerations.77 
The court said the definition of “property of the estate” should be 
construed broadly to include “all property interests of a debtor” 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See infra Part II.C. 
 72. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410–11. 
 73. Id. at 396–97. The firm ultimately converted to a Chapter 11 on January 22, 1998. Id. The firm’s 
dissolution came after several of the so-called “rainmaking” partners indicated an intention to depart. Id. 
at 396. 
 74. Id. at 395. The court previously determined that the law firm was entitled to quantum meruit 
compensation from former attorneys completing contingency cases after dissolution, leaving this 
adversary proceeding to focus entirely on hourly fees. Id. at 396. 
 75. Bankruptcy law requires two questions to be answered in this context: first, whether the fees 
initially belonged to the debtor, as opposed to the attorney personally, and second, whether the fees 
constitute assets of the bankruptcy estate. See id. at 409–11. 
 76. The court relied upon what it referred to as “two fundamental principles of general partnership 
law.” Id. at 410. First, when a partnership dissolves, the existing contracts do not automatically dissolve 
with it. Id. And second, when a former partner completes existing contracts, he does so as a fiduciary 
working for the benefit of the partnership. Id. These principles, coupled with the lack of contrary intent 
and inability to differentiate between contingent and hourly fees, led the court to conclude that all fees, 
regardless of how they were billed, were to be included in the unfinished business rule. Id. at 410–12. 
 77. Id. at 409. (“Although the Defendants bluster about the allegedly disastrous public policy of such 
principles, they are unable to cite any cases from any jurisdictions regarding law firms to the contrary.”). 
Despite what the court called a “sky will be falling” argument by the defendants, it found no record of 
disasters resulting in any jurisdictions that have included hourly fees in the unfinished business rule. Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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regardless of whether that interest is “speculative.”78 Accordingly, the 
court concluded hourly fees have economic value and belong to the 
estate.79 This interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code coupled with 
canons of partnership law focusing on fiduciary duties led the court to 
include hourly fees in the unfinished business rule, as they are an 
integral part of “winding up” the business of the firm.80 The court was 
unreceptive to the “allegedly disastrous public policy of such 
principles,” particularly that the client’s rights would be diminished, 
because the rule does not contemplate overtaking cases without client 
consent but rather only permits claiming a portion of the proceeds from 
that work.81 
2.   Coudert Brothers, LLP 
More recently, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New 
York reached the same conclusion.82 In re Coudert Brothers involved 
a centuries-old law firm that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
September 2006.83 In thirteen separate adversary proceedings to 
                                                                                                                 
 78. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410. According to the court, with the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978, property of the estate was expanded to include “every conceivable interest in property, 
future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative” within the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541. Id. 
  For an example of the unfinished business rule and hourly fees outside the bankruptcy scope, see 
Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 1993). In Rothman, two attorneys voluntarily dissolved 
their partnership and divided up the firm’s cases. Id. at 571. When one partner sued for unfinished business 
profits, the California Court of Appeals did not allow for a distinction between hourly and contingency 
fees, reasoning that such a decision would lead to an avoidance of contingency cases in favor of cases 
billed hourly. Id. at 572–73. The court also emphasized the potential injustice that might arise when one 
partner’s cases are entirely contingency based and another partner’s is entirely hourly based, as the former 
would have to continually share profits and the latter would walk away with a greater share. Id. at 573. 
The practical result, according to the court, would result in attorneys refusing contingency fees if they 
believe dissolution is near. Id. 
 79. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410–11. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. The court relied on other case law, implicitly reasoning that, because no other courts have ruled 
against inclusion of hourly fees, no court should ever rule in favor of excluding hourly fees. Many of the 
cases cited in support of this proposition, however, do not actually relate to hourly-specific cases. See, 
e.g., Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 792–93 (D.C. 1994) (holding that partners do owe one another 
fiduciary duties in winding up the business of the firm but never distinguishing what sort of fees apply); 
Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (addressing “[p]ending contingency 
files” as assets of the firm but not specifically addressing hourly fees). 
 82. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477 
B.R. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 83. Id. at 324. 
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collect unfinished business, the bankruptcy court ruled that the 
doctrine applies to hourly and contingency fees alike.84 The district 
court agreed, stating that “[a] departing partner is not free to walk out 
of his firm’s office carrying a Jackson Pollack painting he ripped off 
the wall,” which justifies applying the rule to both hourly and 
contingency profits as they are often the most valuable assets.85 
The “quaint” principles of partnership law, which require departing 
partners to account to the partnership for profits derived from 
unfinished business, do not allow for a distinction between hourly and 
contingent fees, notwithstanding the unique structure of large law 
firms.86 Large law firms today, the court explained, have various levels 
of partners, “client hoarding, and mercenary lateral hiring” that side 
step the idea of partners as co-owners in favor of a new reality 
inconsistent with traditional notions of partnership.87 Even so, the 
court emphasized that partnerships, by their very nature, must consist 
of co-owners acting together to make a profit.88 Without including 
hourly fees as part of the unfinished business of the firm, certain 
matters would not be jointly owned but rather owned by a single 
attorney operating in the name of the partnership.89 Though many 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. at 324–25. Though the judge acknowledged the issue had never been addressed at the appellate 
level in New York, he ruled that, if faced with the issue, the highest court “would conclude that the 
unfinished business rule applies both to contingency fee matters and to non-contingency (billable hours) 
matters.” Id. at 325. 
 85. Id. at 329. The court went on to add that “[p]artnership property remains partnership property, 
dissolution notwithstanding, and a former partner of the dissolved firm must account for any benefit he 
derives from his use of a partnership asset, even if he is not among the ‘winding up partners’ charged with 
winding up the firm’s affairs.” Id. 
 86. Id. at 331 (ruling that partnership law would not allow for a distinction between hourly and 
contingency fees, even in the face of such sophisticated business models). The argument that mega-firm 
models should necessitate a contrary finding was unappealing to the court, which ruled that the law firms 
can simply alter their partnership agreements if they believe they “need an alternative set of assumptions 
to survive in a new marketplace.” Id. The court even went one step further, ruling that “it is far more 
equitable to ask them to draft any special rules they want to follow than it is to add a gloss to the statute 
applicable to the far more numerous, and undoubtedly less sophisticated, partnerships the affairs of which 
are governed by the Partnership Law.” Id. 
 87. Id. at 330. 
 88. Id.; see REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997) (defining “[p]artnership” as “an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit” (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 89. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331–32 (ruling that the presumption must be that the business 
belongs to the firm, as opposed to an individual attorney, because the business would no longer be carried 
out by “co-owners” but rather a group of attorneys out for themselves, sharing nothing but their office 
16
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firms utilize incentives as a means of encouraging partners to bring 
business into the firm, these incentives rarely, if ever, include granting 
that partner sole ownership of the client matter; rather, the partners 
receive bonuses or some sort of quantum meruit-based compensation 
instead.90 Despite the fact that many attorneys view their “book of 
business” as a coveted personal asset, the court rejected such a notion 
as contrary to the goals of partnership law.91 
There are two ends of a spectrum when it comes to unfinished 
business, as the court explained.92 On one end, there are entirely 
finished matters that are completed before dissolution of the firm,93 
and on the other end, is entirely new business whose relation to the 
former partnership is merely historical.94 In the middle is where the 
conflict lies—in those matters that are not finished upon dissolution 
but are not distinct enough to constitute entirely new business.95 
Executory contracts, as “unperformed” business, inherently constitute 
unfinished business as they are neither new nor completed.96 The court 
ruled that unless the parties indicate a contrary intent, as a matter of 
law, executory contracts must be considered assets of the firm.97 
                                                                                                                 
space). 
 90. Id. at 331. 
 91. Id. at 330; see also Mark Harris, Why More Law Firms Will Go the Way of Dewey & LeBoeuf, 
FORBES, May 8, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/05/08/why-
more-law-firms-will-go-the-way-of-dewey-leboeuf (“The portability of the partner’s book has weakened 
the bonds that hold firms together and threatens the identity of the law firm as we know it.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 92. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 332–33. 
 93. Id. at 332 (for example—a completed merger, a lawsuit tried to verdict, or a settlement). 
 94. Id. (recognizing new business as “an entirely new contract or engagement to do a piece of work” 
and including in that definition retainers, even when it involves an existing client matter such as an 
appeal). 
 95. These matters, according to the court, are “presumptively treated as a partnership asset subject to 
distribution.” Id. 
 96. An executory contract is defined as “[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed or for which 
there remains something still to be done on both sides, often as a component of a larger transaction and 
sometimes memorialized by an informal letter agreement, by a memorandum, or by oral agreement.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 369 (9th ed. 2009). 
 97. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 333–34 (citing Stem v. Warren, 125 N.E. 811 (N.Y. 1920)). Stem 
involved an architecture partnership in the early twentieth century. Stem, 125 N.E. at 811. The partnership 
received a terminable-at-will contract to build Grand Central Station. Id. Before the completion of the 
station, one of the partners died and the partnership dissolved. Id. at 812–13. Upon dissolution, the 
partnership was paid in full for past services rendered. Id. at 813. Later, the contract was officially 
terminated and a new contract was entered into with the surviving half of the partnership. Id. The deceased 
partner’s estate sued for recovery of the total contract under the unfinished business rule and prevailed. 
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To find intent sufficient to overcome the presumption that hourly 
fees are assets of the firm, the court required either a distinction 
between law and general partnerships or between hourly and 
contingent fees.98 Silence in partnership agreements, in this court’s 
opinion, should be construed to signify the parties’ intent to include 
hourly fees as assets of the firm.99 The court paid particular attention 
to the rulings of other UPA courts that did not find a distinction 
between hourly and contingent fees for the purposes of the unfinished 
business rule.100 
To solidify its holding, the court ruled that public policy would not 
dictate a contrary result.101 The defendant argued that new client 
matters are a series of “mini-contracts” with each falling under a new 
billing period, much like a month-to-month lease.102 The court 
recognized that a firm might pursue unpaid bills from clients under this 
“mini-contract” theory, but ruled that a law firm’s rights against the 
client are different from the rights of former partners with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
Id. The fact that the contract was terminable at will and the estate was paid for all work up until the 
partner’s death did not persuade the court to exclude the contract from property of the partnership. Id. The 
court ruled that the executory contract was an extremely valuable asset and the benefits belonged to the 
dissolved partnership. Id. 
 98. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 335–36. 
 99. Id. (“If the partners do not specify whether a particular representation is intended to be an asset of 
the partnership subject to distribution on dissolution, courts treat their silence as signifying an intention 
that it should . . . .”). The court acknowledged many other courts that have adhered to this principle, though 
within the contingency fee context. See, e.g., Santalucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 F.3d 293, 295 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (“[A]bsent an agreement to the contrary, a dissolving law firm is entitled to the value of the 
contingent fee at the time of dissolution.”); Liddle, Robinson & Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 768 N.Y.S.2d 
183, 188 (App. Div. 2003) (“Pending contingency fee cases of a dissolved partnership, absent a contrary 
agreement, are assets subject to distribution.”). 
 100. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 336–37 (referencing the cases in several UPA jurisdictions 
ranging from Pennsylvania to California). This logic seems slightly circular: hourly and contingency fees 
cannot be distinguished because there is no way to distinguish between them, and yet it ignores a primary 
argument in favor of excluding hourly fees—that they constitute finished business. 
  The court stated that “[e]very court in a UPA jurisdiction that has considered the precise question 
posed here has concluded that billable hours matters are partnership assets in the absence of any expressed 
intention that they should be treated otherwise.” Id. at 336. However, that assertion cannot be true as one 
New York court ruled just that way a year earlier. See Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, 
LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011). 
  Of note, even this court said “I cannot quarrel with the proposition that contingency and billable 
hour matters are different in critical respects,” which is perplexing considering its ruling to the contrary. 
In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 337. 
 101. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340–44. 
 102. Id. at 337–38. 
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each other.103 The unfinished business rule, the court reasoned, is 
meant to prevent one partner from exploiting assets against another, 
not to enable a firm to recover clients’ missed payments, and the 
remedies for collection are separate from any fiduciary 
responsibilities.104 
The court added that all other UPA jurisdictions hearing similar 
cases have reached the same conclusion regarding public policy and 
the attorney-client relationship.105 Although recognizing a conflict 
between the application of the unfinished business rule and a client’s 
right to choose counsel, the court elected to join other courts that have 
set this argument aside as a non-issue.106 In so doing, the court relied 
upon Santalucia, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case ruling in 
favor of including contingency fees in the unfinished business rule.107 
The court held that the Santalucia ruling, which did not express 
concern regarding an impact on the attorney-client relationship, should 
apply to hourly fees as well because any deterrent to a client’s right to 
choose would be present irrespective of the way firms bill the client.108 
B.   A Lesson in Public Policy: Excluding Hourly Fees From the 
Unfinished Business Rule 
Contrarily, some courts have ruled that a meaningful distinction 
exists between hourly and contingency fees, and that the former should 
be excluded from the reach of the unfinished business rule.109 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 338. Unlike a month-to-month lease, which, according to the court, is a series of mini-
contracts, the fact that bills are sent out periodically rather than upon completion of the entire matter does 
not render the matter “closed” upon payment of the bill. Id. at 339. 
 104. Id. at 338 (“The unfinished business doctrine does not exist to assure that a law firm is paid for the 
value of work it has performed prior to dissolution. It exists to settle accounts among partners upon 
dissolution of their business.”). 
 105. Id. at 340; see, e.g., Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 
Cal. Rptr. 13 (Ct. App. 1984). But see Welman v. Parker, 328 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) 
(noting that the unfinished business rule could “unduly impinge upon the client’s perceived freedom to 
change attorneys without cause and could have a ‘chilling effect’ upon the choice of that option by the 
client” (citing Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)). 
 106. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340 (recognizing the public policy argument as the strongest 
offered by the defendants, but ultimately deciding to rule alongside its fellow UPA courts). 
 107. Id. at 344. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 739–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6 (N.Y. 
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1.   Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan 
One case involving the voluntary dissolution of a partnership 
reached the conclusion that hourly fees must be excluded.110 The court 
noted that, despite an inability or unwillingness to do so by previous 
courts, a key difference exists between hourly and contingency fees; a 
fee collected from a contingency case could easily result in a fee 
greater than the work done by a single attorney, whereas a case billed 
hourly could leave the attorney with substantially less than his hourly 
rate.111 In the former situation, a firm could pay the attorney his normal 
rate and still retain a profit, while the latter lends itself to the possibility 
of under compensation. The partner would be required to pay the estate 
from his hourly rate and retain either no compensation or what a court 
deems reasonable compensation, depending on the jurisdiction, 
reducing the compensation he would receive had the dissolution never 
occurred—an obvious disincentive to continue representation.112 
The court also referred to New York’s disciplinary rules that 
prohibit dividing fees for legal services with an attorney who is not 
associated with a firm unless certain specific conditions are met.113 
                                                                                                                 
Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011). 
 110. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *1–3, *6. The facts between the two parties were largely disputed 
as to how the firm ended. Id. at *3. Sheresky asserted that he was the “mainstay” of the firm and personally 
guaranteed a new lease for the firm if it paid off his mortgage and life insurance. Id. at *1–2. The other 
partners argued that the additional monthly payments were “buyout” agreements. Id. at *2. Ultimately, 
the new partners formed a new firm without Sheresky and dissolved the former firm in August 2010. Id. 
 111. Id. at *6. The court ruled the inclusion of hourly fees in the unfinished business rule would run 
contrary to a New York rule prohibiting attorneys from dividing fees for legal services when the attorneys 
are not affiliated with the same firm. Id. 
 112. Id. To require an attorney to pay back hourly fees to the estate would seemingly contradict the rule 
adopted in Kirsch v. Leventhal that allows an attorney to deduct an amount attributable to his “efforts, 
skill and diligence.” Kirsch v. Leventhal, 586 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (App. Div. 1992). The hourly fee, at 
least in theory, is equal to that very amount and repaying that fee to the estate would reduce the 
compensation due to the attorney. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6. 
 113. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *5. 
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not associated 
in the same law firm unless: 
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing 
given to the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 
(2) the client agrees to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division 
of fees will be made, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the client’s 
agreement is confirmed in writing; and 
(3) the total fee is not excessive. 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0, r. 1.5(g) (2013). The rule does not prohibit payment to 
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With these considerations in mind, the court was unreceptive to a result 
that would broaden the scope of the unfinished business rule to include 
hourly fees.114 
2.   Thelen LLP 
In what it called the “alarming phenomenon” of law firm 
bankruptcies, a court in the Southern District of New York reached the 
same conclusion, putting itself directly at odds with the Coudert 
court.115 This court emphasized the inherent conflict between property 
of the estate and what it called the “essence of the attorney-client 
relationship” when it ruled that hourly fees should not be included in 
the purview of the unfinished business rule.116 Thelen, a California law 
firm, voluntarily filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in September 2009.117 As 
its attorneys scattered to other firms, the estate initiated adversary 
proceedings against those partners and their new firms for the 
unfinished business of the bankrupt firm.118 
One such adversary proceeding was governed by New York law, 
despite a partnership agreement and choice of laws provision to the 
contrary.119 The court recognized that, although it was well-settled that 
                                                                                                                 
an attorney formerly affiliated with the firm if a separation or retirement agreement is in place. Id. 
§ 1200.0, r. 1.5(h). 
 114. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *7. 
 115. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The 
court, sua sponte, granted interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether hourly fees are included in the 
unfinished business rule. Id. at 736. 
 116. Id. at 735. 
 117. Id. at 736. 
 118. Id. at 736–37. There were two key adversary proceedings at issue in the case, both arising from 
unfinished business claims. The first was against Seyfarth Shaw and the second against Robinson & Cole, 
both law firms with former Thelen partners. See id. at 736–37. 
 119. In some choice of laws gymnastics, the court entirely circumvented a written partnership 
agreement with a choice of laws provision requiring California law to govern. Id. at 737–38. The court 
ruled that the fourth partnership agreement entered into by the Thelen partners constituted a fraudulent 
transfer because it was entered into while the firm was insolvent. Id. The court reasoned that choice of 
laws provisions only govern contractual causes of action, and because fraudulent transfers are within the 
realm of tort law and the fraudulent transfer occurred in New York, New York law would apply. Id. 
  However, New York law only applied as to Seyfarth Shaw and California law applied to Robinson 
& Cole. Id. at 743. California has adopted the RUPA and its standard of reasonable compensation in lieu 
of the former UPA standard of no compensation relied upon in Jewel. Id. at 744. The court ruled, with 
respect to California law, that “to the extent that Robinson & Cole earned profits from former Thelen 
matters exceeding ‘reasonable compensation,’ California law dictates that those profits belong to Thelen.” 
Id. at 745. 
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contingency fees would be included as property of the estate, only one 
New York court previously addressed the issue with respect to hourly 
fees.120 Like the court in Sheresky, the Thelen court emphasized the 
financial burden and disincentive that would result if the unfinished 
business rule encompassed hourly fees.121 However, the court went 
one step further than Sheresky, arguing that an expansion of the 
doctrine would result in an “unjust windfall” to the estate while 
simultaneously undercutting the public policies discussed in 
Sheresky.122 Additionally, other New York courts held that when an 
attorney leaves a partnership and tries a case in its entirety, his former 
law firm will only be entitled for its share up until the date of 
dissolution, not the entire bill.123 Because an hourly matter is 
completed almost entirely due to an attorney’s “post-dissolution 
efforts, skill and diligence,” the court ruled that including hourly fees 
in the unfinished business rule would be directly at odds with this 
precedent.124 
The court also rejected the notion that executory contracts were 
always property of the estate, unless explicit intent dictated a contrary 
result, in favor of a more limited approach.125 The court reasoned that 
an executory contract should only be included as property of the estate 
where the parties “contemplate[] that it should survive 
dissolution . . . .”126 With respect to hourly fees, it would be impossible 
for the parties to contemplate post-dissolution survival—one cannot 
contemplate that a contract will remain post-dissolution without 
simultaneously infringing the client’s right to terminate his attorney at 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. at 739–40. Although the Sheresky case was not binding because it was a state court decision, 
its reasoning was afforded “great weight.” Id. at 740 (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Brooklyn 
Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 850 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 121. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740. 
 122. Id. at 740 (“Unlike in the contingency fee context, applying the unfinished business doctrine to 
pending hourly fee matters would result in an unjust windfall for the Thelen estate, as ‘compensating a 
former partner out of that fee would reduce the compensation of the attorneys performing the work.’” 
(quoting Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at 
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 740 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Shandell v. Katz, 629 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (App. Div. 
1995)). 
 125. Id. at 741. 
 126. Id. (quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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will.127 
Finally, the court addressed a potential unintended and “bizarre 
consequence[]” that could result from including hourly fees in property 
of the estate.128 If hourly fees are property of the estate, the trustee 
could sell off clients one by one.129 Allowing a firm to “liquidate” its 
clients would not only be inconsistent with a client’s right to choose 
and terminate counsel, it would essentially terminate this right 
altogether.130 Ultimately, the court primarily focused on public policy, 
as opposed to a strict interpretation of partnership law, to exclude 
hourly fees from the unfinished business rule.131 
C.   “Doctrinal Uncertainty” Continues: The Second Circuit’s 
Decision in Thelen 
The trustee in Thelen timely appealed the district court’s ruling to 
exclude hourly fees from property of the estate.132 On November 15, 
2013, the Second Circuit, after holding that New York and not 
California law applied, addressed the application of the unfinished 
business rule to hourly fees.133 The court began by briefly explaining 
the rule and its history relating to contingent fees, noting the 
“scant . . . authority” with respect to the rule’s application to hourly 
fees.134 Recognizing the split within the Southern District of New York 
specifically, the court stated that given “this doctrinal uncertainty, it is 
unsurprising that courts . . . have split on whether the unfinished 
business doctrine applies to a law firm’s pending hourly fee 
matters.”135 
                                                                                                                 
 127. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741–42 (citing Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 
387, 389 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a client has an “absolute right” to terminate the attorney-client 
relationship at any time and for any reason)). 
 128. Id. at 741. 
 129. Id. When the court asked the trustee if the debtor firm could sell off pending matters, he was 
“unable to answer definitively.” Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. at 742–43. 
 132. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2013), certified 
question accepted sub nom. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 22 N.Y.3d 1017 (2013). 
 133. Id. at 220–24. 
 134. Id. at 220–21. 
 135. Id. at 221, 225. 
23
Worrell: Covering Your Assets: The Unfinished Business Rule and Bankrupt L
Published by Reading Room, 2014
848 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
Ultimately, the court never reached a conclusion. Instead, it listed 
the arguments on both sides of the issue, certified the question to the 
New York Court of Appeals, and retained jurisdiction to decide the 
case following that decision.136 The court emphasized the following 
advantages of including hourly fees as unfinished business: (1) 
partnership rules are simply defaults that can easily be drafted to the 
contrary, (2) the majority of states that have adopted the Uniform 
Partnership Act include hourly fees as unfinished business, and (3) a 
public policy concern exists in having different rules for hourly and 
contingent cases.137 The different standards could create discrepancies 
in the fiduciary duties owed to the firm based on the type of billing 
involved, encouraging the view that “an individual partner’s book of 
business is not an asset of the firm, but instead a piece of personal 
property to be guarded with a Cerberus-like ferociousness.”138 
The court additionally recognized the following benefits of 
excluding hourly fees from unfinished business: (1) the special nature 
of the attorney-client relationship, particularly that the client “has an 
unassailable right to discharge an attorney at any time, with or without 
cause,” (2) applying the doctrine to hourly fees could discourage other 
law firms from accepting client matters or former attorneys from 
dissolved law firms, (3) the rules of professional conduct could very 
well forbid the unfinished business rule by prohibiting agreements that 
restrict lawyer mobility, and (4) hourly fees are inherently different 
from contingent fees, as the work on the matter is complete at the time 
of payment rather than ongoing.139 
The court concluded by stating that “[g]iven the significance of 
these issues to members of the New York bar, we hesitate to 
definitively resolve them without first seeking the views of the New 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 220–24. The court certified the question as follows: “Under New York law, is a client matter 
that is billed on an hourly basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in related 
bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit earned on such matters as the ‘unfinished 
business’ of the firm?” Id. at 225. 
 137. Id. at 221–22. 
 138. In re Thelen, 736 F.3d at 222. 
 139. Id. at 222–23. With regard to the third point, the court explicitly stated “we cannot rule out the 
possibility that, confronted with a novel application of the rule, that court might conclude that the 
unfinished business rule should not apply to any of a law firm’s cases.” Id. at 223. 
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York Court of Appeals . . . .”140 On December 12, 2013, the New York 
Court of Appeals accepted certification of the questions and currently 
awaits briefs and arguments from the parties.141 
III.   A PLEA FOR CLIENT PROTECTION: REMOVING HOURLY FEES 
FROM THE REACH OF THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE 
In modern practice, where mega-firms are common and client rights 
are of the utmost importance, hourly fees must be excluded from the 
unfinished business rule. Although it is certainly true that partnerships 
can avoid the unfinished business rule entirely, assuming they amend 
partnership agreements in time,142 why should that be a determining 
factor? The majority rule, as it stands today, functions as a limitation 
on practice that favors the bankrupt estate at the expense of attorneys, 
clients, and the very foundation of the attorney-client relationship.143 
Ultimately, hourly fees should be excluded from the unfinished 
business rule for several reasons: (1) to avoid over-compensating the 
estate while under-compensating its attorneys;144 (2) to protect a 
client’s right to choose his attorney;145 (3) to protect an attorney’s right 
to mobility;146 and (4) to avoid unintended consequences in the realm 
of bankruptcy law.147 
A.   Overcompensation at the Client’s Expense 
As the Thelen court aptly stated, the inclusion of hourly fees in the 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 223–24. 
 141. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 22 N.Y.3d 1017 (2013). 
 142. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 
477 B.R. 318, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasizing that law firms may provide an “alternative set of 
assumptions” in partnership agreements); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984). However, 
law firms must be careful to not put “Jewel waivers” in place if the firm is insolvent to avoid fraudulent 
transfer claims. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 736–37; In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R. 
318, 336–37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 143. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 735 (“The pursuit of pending hourly fee matters as assets of the estate 
has become a recurring feature of such bankruptcies. But this concept of law firm ‘property’ collides with 
the essence of the attorney-client relationship.”). 
 144. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 145. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 146. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 147. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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unfinished business rule will almost certainly result in an “unjust 
windfall” to the bankrupt estate.148 An important distinction must be 
made, however, in that most courts in UPA jurisdictions, rather than 
RUPA jurisdictions, have addressed the unfinished business rule and 
hourly fees.149 The RUPA, which has been adopted in a majority of 
states, does away with the no compensation rule set forth in the UPA 
in favor of a more attorney-friendly reasonable compensation 
standard.150 
In states that retain the antiquated UPA no compensation rule, the 
estate will often receive more money than it would receive absent the 
dissolution.151 With respect to contingency fees, the estate will receive 
whatever profits exceeded the partner’s compensation, and it will also 
tap into what the partner would have received had the firm remained 
intact because that partner cannot receive extra compensation under 
this traditional rule.152 Hourly fees, on the other hand, are based 
entirely on the number of hours an attorney works. A firm remaining 
in business would not cut into the partner’s hourly profits, and the firm 
should not do so simply because it ran into financial trouble. The 
unfinished business rule, in this respect, benefits the estate at the 
expense of the partner, who in all likelihood did not contribute to the 
firm’s demise.153 As a basic policy matter, partnership law should not 
allow an estate to get more than its fair share simply because it chose 
to dissolve or filed bankruptcy. 
It would seem that the RUPA’s adoption of reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 148. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740. 
 149. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. 
LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Murov v. Ades, 786 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div. 2004). 
Notably, Murov only addresses contingency fee cases and does not involve calculation of hourly fees. 786 
N.Y.S.2d at 79. 
 150. See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text. 
 151. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740 (“Unlike in the contingency fee context, applying the unfinished 
business doctrine to pending hourly fee matters would result in an unjust windfall for the Thelen estate, 
as ‘compensating a former partner out of that fee would reduce the compensation of the attorneys 
performing the work.’” (quoting Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, 950 N.Y.S.2d 611, at 
*5 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision))). 
 152. See id. 
 153. In these bankrupt mega-firms with hundreds of partners, it is unlikely that many partners played a 
crucial role in the financial affairs of the partnership. See Lattman, supra note 5 (discussing the 
investigation into the former chairman of Dewey & LeBoeuf for financial misconduct). 
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compensation would remedy the issue discussed above.154 
Unfortunately, the reasonable compensation standard presents a 
different set of issues whose uncertainty can lead to the same result as 
the no compensation rule.155 Though the reasonable compensation rule 
provides a more equitable outcome for attorneys on a contingency 
basis, the same cannot be said for its result with hourly fees. With 
hourly fees, the attorney and his client contracted for a specified rate. 
To chip away from the attorney’s salary after a firm dissolves and give 
him only what a court deems “reasonable” would place a trustee or 
judge in between the attorney and his client, fundamentally altering the 
relationship.156 
B.   Preserving the Client’s Right to Choose Counsel 
What makes the legal partnership special is the protected 
relationship of attorneys and their clients.157 As a general rule, clients 
have an “absolute power to discharge an attorney, with or without 
cause.”158 Where hundreds, thousands, and even millions of dollars are 
spent on very technical topics that require a great deal of skill, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 154. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (1997). The reasonable compensation standard seems to at 
least take into account the degree of work put in by an attorney. 
 155. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477 
B.R. 318, 349–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (recognizing the difficulty in determining compensation where an 
attorney’s “efforts, skill and diligence” are included, though in the context of an amended UPA 
jurisdiction rather than RUPA (internal quotations omitted)). This is particularly true in jurisdictions, like 
that of Coudert, which have modified the no compensation rule to include compensation for an attorney’s 
“efforts, skill, and diligence.” Id. at 349. Absent clearer instruction, courts will be forced to take on a 
“thorny task” that they hardly have the resources to complete. Id. at 350. 
 156. See id. at 350. In the Coudert decision, the judge noted her disinclination to tackle the issues as 
they would “go far beyond the bounds of th[e] opinion.” Id. at 349–50. Additionally, and assuming the 
rates set are reasonable, there would be no hourly fees for the unfinished business rule to claim, 
eliminating the necessity of their inclusion in the first place. 
 157. See Echlin v. Sup. Ct. of San Mateo Cnty., 90 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1939) (recognizing the client’s 
right to choose and terminate counsel as “universal”). 
 158. Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The 
No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1603–04 (1985). As another court put 
it, “[c]lients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesman. They have nothing to sell but personal 
service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts 
of our professional status.” Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (internal 
quotations omitted). As the American Bar Association wrote, “each client has the right to choose the 
departing lawyer or the firm, or another lawyer to represent him” in the event of dissolution. ABA Formal 
Op. 414 (1999). 
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important that the client have “complete confidence” in his attorney.159 
Courts across the country have recognized that the unfinished 
business rule conflicts with clients’ right to choose.160 Any attempt to 
consider clients as property or “merchandise” would inevitably run 
afoul of the “best concepts of [] professional status.”161 The basic 
premise of the unfinished business rule is that client matters unfinished 
at the time of dissolution are “property of the estate.”162 This, however, 
cannot be true: “Clients are not the ‘property’ of the attorney or law 
firm who represents their interests; clients are free to discharge their 
attorney at any time, for whatever reason.”163 
Although Jewel and other courts have addressed—and dismissed—
this concern, they have done so assuming that the client already made 
his choice and the unfinished business rule relates only to payment.164 
Although this assumption may be sound in a contingency fee scenario 
where the client stays with the same attorney until completion of the 
matter, it makes less sense in the context of hourly fees.165 Hourly fees 
are in essence “mini-contracts” or puzzle pieces that make up the 
entirety of the relationship.166 To say that the client has made his 
choice at the time of dissolution is to ignore the very real possibility 
that, at any time, he can take his business elsewhere. Although the 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 158, at 1604. This point is furthered by the fact that, even where a 
client breaches a contingency fee contract with an attorney or law firm, the firm is entitled to no more than 
the services rendered on a quantum meruit basis. E.g., Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809 
F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 160. See, e.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 341–42; Welman v. Parker, 328 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2010); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Ct. App. 1984); Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 
588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
 161. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411 (internal quotations omitted). 
 162. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(recognizing the relevant issue as whether the hourly client fees are “property” belonging to the firm). 
 163. Welman, 328 S.W.3d at 457. 
 164. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331; Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17–18. 
 165. Contingency fee cases, in this regard, have been extensively handled by courts. If a client elects to 
terminate an attorney in the middle of a contingency fee arrangement, the attorney may only recover on a 
quantum meruit basis. E.g., Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Contingency fee cases, by their nature, are ongoing, and clients maintain their attorneys so long as they 
choose or until the end of the case. Hourly fees are more complex because, as evidenced by recent case 
law, it is difficult to determine when they begin and end. See generally In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. 318; 
In re Thelen, 476 B.R. 732. 
 166. Although this description fits well within the conceptual framework of hourly fees—that is, hourly 
cases are billed periodically and can easily be broken down by billing period—some courts have been 
unreceptive to such a characterization. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 338–39. 
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client is likely unphased by accounting decisions of law firms so long 
as his matters are handled appropriately, those accounting measures 
have a chilling effect on the client’s choice and the attorney’s 
practice.167 Including hourly fees in the unfinished business rule 
assumes that the client never intended to treat each billing cycle as a 
new matter, which is entirely inconsistent with the client’s right to 
terminate.168 
As courts recognize, these unfinished hourly contracts are 
executory.169 Though one court stated that, to be excluded from the 
reach of the unfinished business rule, the parties must explicitly so 
intend, this argument is misplaced.170 Though it is true that a contrary 
intention expressly written would be beneficial to determine the 
partners’ intent, such an agreement does not eliminate the relevancy of 
the client’s intent. The client is an integral part of the attorney-client 
relationship and if the client, who retains the power to terminate at will, 
does not contemplate that the contract should endure beyond 
dissolution, there is no reason to impose such an assumption.171 
C.   Protecting the Attorney’s Right to Practice 
Alongside the client’s right to choose counsel is the attorney’s right 
                                                                                                                 
 167. It is difficult to imagine clients caring about where each specific dollar is going as long as the work 
is completed at the proper level; but the client’s choice will be affected if the attorney does not wish to 
continue representation at the risk of reduced compensation for his work. 
 168. With all executory contracts, if the partners indicate a contrary intent in their partnership 
agreements, they will not be included as property of the estate upon dissolution of the partnership. See, 
e.g., Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996). This assertion ignores the possibility 
that the client originally intended for each billing period to be a separate contract. 
 169. Hourly fees in the context of the unfinished business rule must be classified as “executory”; 
otherwise they would be considered new or completed business. See supra note 96 and accompanying 
text. 
 170. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 333. 
 171. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The 
Thelen court recognized that legal contracts are “categorically different” from other types of professional 
contracts because a distinct public policy interest is well-established in the relationship between a client 
and his attorney. Id. at 742–43. Relying on precedent, the court noted that previous case law held these 
contracts could be property of the estate “if an executory contract with a third party contemplates that it 
should survive dissolution.” Id. at 741 (quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotations omitted). The parties, however, could not contemplate the continued existence of 
these contracts: “Thelen’s hourly fee matters cannot have contemplated post-dissolution survival without 
infringing a client’s right to terminate an attorney at will.” Id. 
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to practice.172 Although the Coudert court recognized that the practice 
of law is unique, it did not see fit to carve out an exception for law 
firms in the unfinished business rule, despite the fact that courts have 
carved out exceptions before.173 According to the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a 
partnership . . . that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after 
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning 
benefits upon retirement; or (b) an agreement in which a 
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement 
of a client controversy.174 
Without this rule, it would be impossible to guarantee a client’s right 
to choose.175 If attorneys are not free to practice how they choose, the 
client’s choice is severely limited. 
Courts consistently hold that any sort of “financial disincentive for 
the lawyer to continue representing his clients of his former firm” 
prevents lawyer mobility and violates public policy.176 A common 
“financial disincentive” is a restrictive covenant, which prevents 
attorneys from practicing law during a certain time frame or in a 
certain geographic area.177 The inclusion of hourly fees should be 
treated in the same manner as restrictive covenants, as both constitute 
financial disincentives. If an attorney makes less money on hourly 
cases than he would otherwise, common sense dictates that he will stop 
taking those cases, limiting both the client’s right to choose and the 
                                                                                                                 
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2012). 
 173. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340. As the Coudert court noted, retainers are excluded from the 
unfinished business rule as presumptively “new business.” Id. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). Certain 
partnership agreements have also been rejected because they limit attorney mobility, such as restrictive 
covenants. Id. at 341. As the Coudert court recognized, restrictive covenants in the practice of law violate 
public policy. Id. Given that certain matters have already been excluded from the unfinished business 
matter and the inclusion of hourly fees acts as a substantial financial disincentive, hourly fees should be 
excluded from the rule as well. 
 174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6. 
 175. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that an attorney’s right to 
practice is “to ensure that the public has the choice of counsel”). 
 176. See, e.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 341. 
 177. Id. 
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attorney’s ability to practice freely.178 
Beyond the attorney’s choices as to what types of cases to take, the 
unfinished business rule’s application to hourly fees could prove 
detrimental to the attorney’s subsequent employment. It is not just 
former partners that are sued for unfinished business; it is their new 
partnerships as well.179 At the most fundamental level, it is more 
difficult to calculate hourly fees than contingent fees. Contingency 
cases relate to a particular client matter and are entirely outcome-
dependent; the firm will typically receive a percentage of whatever 
award is granted.180 Rather than bother with potential liability, firms 
could easily forego hiring partners of dissolved firms until their 
liability is extinguished to avoid unfinished business claims against 
them.181 A future firm will likely struggle, as courts do now, to 
determine what constitutes “hourly fees” and how they should be 
calculated.182 It is significantly easier to disclose all pending 
contingency matters so that the new firm can make an informed hiring 
decision, but the concept of hourly fees is more esoteric. Due to the 
inherent difficulty in calculation and potential impact on representing 
clients or seeking future employment upon dissolution, the inclusion 
of hourly fees in the unfinished business rule is as much a financial 
disincentive to practice as restrictive covenants and should be treated 
with equal skepticism. 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Impermissible financial disincentives have been described as anything that “‘functionally and 
realistically discourage[s]’ a . . . partner from serving clients.” Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & 
Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411); see also Jacob v. Norris, 
McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 149 (N.J. 1992); Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner 
& Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601–02 (Iowa 1990). 
 179. E.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 322; Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 
476 B.R. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 180. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (9th ed. 2009). 
 181. Firms will not face the same unknown liability with contingency cases because it is easier to 
disclose pending contingency matters. See supra note 24 (describing the difference between hourly and 
contingency fees). Because a contingency fee is based entirely on the final award received and is only 
complete when the client terminates the arrangement or the case is closed, it poses a more concrete 
relationship as opposed to hourly fees, which can be broken down into mere minutes with no definite 
beginning or end. A law firm will be able to make an informed decision as to whether it wishes to take 
the reduced compensation for the partner’s time in contingency cases, but the same is not true of hourly 
cases. 
 182. This fact is evidenced by the amount of litigation and time expended resolving such conflicts. E.g., 
In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. 318; In re Thelen, 476 B.R. 732. 
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D.   The Law of Unintended Consequences in Bankruptcy Court 
The unfinished business rule, in the bankruptcy context, can easily 
infringe on a fundamental bankruptcy right—the automatic stay.183 
When any entity files for bankruptcy, perhaps the greatest advantage 
is the automatic stay. The stay has been described as “‘closing the 
windows and locking the doors’ to prevent any property from leaving 
the newly formed estate.”184 Upon filing for bankruptcy, the automatic 
stay prohibits creditors from taking any property from the estate, 
pending resolution of the case.185 Assuming, arguendo, that hourly fees 
are property of the estate, clients who fire their attorneys while some 
of the business remains “unfinished” could feasibly be liable for 
violating the stay.186 
This result, however, cannot be allowed. Inextricably tied to the 
client’s right to choose is the client’s right to terminate counsel.187 
When the Thelen court raised this very concern, the trustee was unable 
to give a definitive answer as to whether a trustee may liquidate client 
matters to satisfy debts of the estate or if a client could violate the 
automatic stay by firing an attorney from a bankrupt law firm.188 It is, 
in this respect, that partnership law and bankruptcy principles come to 
a head. Clients must be free to hire, fire, or re-hire any attorney they 
please, even at the expense of creditors.189 
                                                                                                                 
 183. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012) (“[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this 
title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to obtain possession of property of the 
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate . . . .”). 
 184. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: 
TEXTS, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 131 (6th ed. 2009). 
 185. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (prohibiting “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of 
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” upon filing a bankruptcy 
petition). 
 186. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
 187. A comment in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “A client has a right to discharge 
a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services. 
Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written 
statement reciting the circumstances.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 4 (2012). Forty 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the comments as “guides to interpretation.” CPR Policy 
Implementation Committee, State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Comments, ABA (May 23, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ 
comments.authcheckdam.pdf. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the client’s right to choose. 
 188. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
 189. Of note, the trustee already has a plethora of ways to bring money back into the estate through its 
various clawback and avoidance powers. See supra notes 13–14. 
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CONCLUSION 
Amidst speculation of financial demise, it is all too likely the Dewey 
& LeBoeuf partners experienced several immediate concerns—where 
they will work, how they will pay their bills, and if they will have to 
move.190 The unfinished business rule likely never crossed their minds. 
That very rule, which allows claims against former partners for profits 
earned while completing the unfinished business of the firm, can lead 
to a deterioration of savings, client relationships, and employment 
prospects.191 
Although partnership law recognizes that partners, as co-owners, 
owe fiduciary duties to each other, a degree of practicality is 
desperately needed.192 Including hourly fees in the unfinished business 
rule and expanding its breadth will undoubtedly lead to weakening of 
the attorney-client relationship, reducing the client to nothing more 
than a piece of property.193 And for what reason? 
Favoring creditors and the estate at the expense of the attorney and 
the client is hardly the preferable option, particularly when the result 
can have a devastating impact on future firms, former partners, and 
existing clients.194 Rather than adhere to an antiquated approach that 
ignores the basic elements of legal practice and the culture of practice 
today, courts should eliminate hourly fees from the unfinished 
business rule to preserve the client’s right to hire or fire counsel and to 
avoid litigation that inevitably treats a client as nothing more than a 
Jackson Pollack painting stripped off the wall.195 
   
                                                                                                                 
 190. Key Events for Dewey, supra note 6 (providing a timeline of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s 2012 failure). 
 191. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. 
LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (providing a general definition of the unfinished business rule). 
 192. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 193. See discussion supra Part III. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
see also discussion supra Part III. 
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